PERRYSCOPE
Perry Diaz
Perry Diaz
Recently,
China confirmed that construction work is ongoing at the Mabini Reef (Johnson
South Reef) in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea). However, she declined
to say what she’s constructing. She told the Philippines that it’s none of her
business because the area is “Chinese territory.”
It doesn’t matter that Mabini Reef is within the Philippines’ 200-mile
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and it doesn’t matter that Mabini Reef is within
the Philippines’ continental shelf, both of which are covered by the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). With more than 60 countries
signing the treaty, including China and the Philippines, the UNCLOS took effect
in 1982. Yet, China roguishly ignores the UNCLOS.
Today, China insists that an arbitrarily drawn nine-dash line, which
bounds about 90% of the South China Sea, delineates what she claims as
“undisputable sovereignty” and “core national interest,” a euphemism she uses
to signify that an area of land or water is non-negotiable territory.
With no coordinates to pinpoint the exact boundary of the nine-dash-line, the
claimed area covers parts of her southern neighbors’ EEZ. These countries
are Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, and lately,
Indonesia.
Reclamation
The reclamation of roughly five square kilometers of the subsurface area
around the tiny Mabini Reef would require moving large volume of rock and soil
from China, more than 600 miles away. It’s estimated that the reclamation
and construction of the airbase would take 10 years to complete.
But China must have surmised that it’s worth the gargantuan effort
because it would result in her establishing a strategic foothold -- for
the first time outside China -- where her navy, air force, troops, ballistic
missiles, and drones could reach Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and
everybody else within 1,500 miles. With naval and air bases on Mabini
Reef, China would come eyeball-to-eyeball with the Philippines… and, by
extension, the U.S. It would, in effect, break the First Island Chain,
America’s first line of defense against Chinese aggression, which runs from
Japan through Taiwan, the Philippines, Borneo, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Vietnam. It also runs parallel to the nine-dash line.
Chokepoints
If China took unchallenged possession of the South China Sea, she would be in a position to keep the Strait of Malacca open to Chinese maritime routes for oil from the Middle East and Africa, which comprises 80% her foreign oil imports.
If China took unchallenged possession of the South China Sea, she would be in a position to keep the Strait of Malacca open to Chinese maritime routes for oil from the Middle East and Africa, which comprises 80% her foreign oil imports.
Should the Strait of Malacca be closed, the Straits of Sunda and Lombok
in Indonesia and the Timor Sea would provide China with alternate maritime
routes. However, Australia, which is a key U.S. ally, could play a
crucial role should war break out between the U.S. and China. Darwin,
which is a forward operating base for American forces in Australia, could deny
China’s use of these sea-lanes.
With the conversion of Oyster Bay in Palawan into a mini-Subic naval
base for Philippine and U.S. naval forces, a Chinese military base on Mabini
Reef could effectively close the Ulugan Bay where naval vessels from the inner
Oyster Bay had to pass through to get into the West Philippine Sea.
From a geostrategic standpoint, it would be a prized appendage for China, but
it would be a pain in the groin for the U.S. and the Philippines.
Air-Sea Battle
Given U.S. President Barack Obama’s plan to rebalance 60% of America’s
naval and air forces to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, China’s military presence
on Mabini Reef would enhance her Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy,
which was designed to counter the U.S.’s Air Sea Battle (ASB) plan.
The question is: What can the Philippines do to assert her sovereignty
over Mabini Reef and other islands in the Spratly archipelago that China is
fortifying with offensive military assets? The problem is that the
Philippines doesn’t have the capability to stop China on her own. She
relies on the U.S.’s presumed “ironclad” guarantee to come to her aid should
hostility erupt over territorial disputes with China. There is no such
“ironclad” guarantee.
The truth of the matter is the U.S. had repeatedly voiced out her
neutrality on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The latest
was last May 31 in Singapore when U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel reportedly
warned Lt. Gen. Wang Guanzhong that “the U.S. will not look the other way when
nations such as China try to restrict navigation or ignore international rules
and standards.” However, he also parroted Obama’s cliché that the
U.S. is neutral and doesn’t take any side on territorial disputes in the South
China Sea. That means that the Philippines is on her own in defending her
sovereignty and territorial integrity when it comes to any of the islands in
the South China, which the U.S. had claimed as not being covered by the 1951
Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). The rationale for the exclusion was that the
Spratly islands were not included as Philippine territory; hence, not covered
by MDT.
Treaty ally
And this brings to mind the question: Isn’t a “treaty ally” – as
the U.S. refers to the Philippines -- an ally in every sense of the word?
Or is it just something that is applied for the U.S.’s convenience when her
“core interests” are imperiled?
Evidently – unlike Japan -- the Philippines is not one of America’s
“core interests” after the Philippine Senate had unceremoniously evicted the
U.S. bases in 1991. Since then the U.S. has configured her military
defense structure in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region without any consideration for
the Philippines as part of the defense arc circling China. In other
words, the Philippines has zero geopolitical value to the U.S. She simply
didn’t exist.
But now, after President Benigno Aquino III begged the U.S. to come
back, he has to regain the U.S.’s unqualified support for the Philippines, not
just a “treaty ally” but also a “true ally.” At the end of the day, the
Philippines has her work cut out rebuilding U.S.-Philippine alliance.
It’s not going to happen overnight; but it will, slowly but surely. (PerryDiaz@gmail.com)
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